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 Mark Findlay, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics
 Organised crime
 as terrorism
 In a somewhat belated incursion into the international debate about the threat
 of organised crime, Federal and State governments in Australia have chosen
 to represent the 'menace' as an attack on the institution of the state as much
 as a physical and financial danger to society.1 This is consistent with the
 approaches of governments in the United States and Italy in constructing the
 reality of the Mafia.
 As a general rule the state will choose to simplify and stereotype the threat
 of organised crime in a manner which corresponds with its response to
 terrorism. It will reduce the nature and complexity of its existence and
 operations into terms which would seem to merit a simple ideological response.
 But the parallels between the state's response to organised crime and to
 terrorism do not end here. By concentrating on the violent and intimidatory
 characteristics of some forms of collective behaviour said to be hallmarks of
 organised crime, the consequent propensity to engender terror throughout the
 community is usually appreciated as justification for a unique response to
 the phenomena. When the criminal sanction is a central feature of this response,
 the usual guarantees nominally attendant on its administration are often com
 promised for the sake of controlling such a radical and all pervasive menace.
 Organised crime, like terrorism, can be seen as antipathetic to good
 government. The state's involvement with or fostering of organised crime (as
 with state based terrorism) can be ignored or obscured through the
 representation of the 'Mr Bigs' as subversive of legitimate commerce, demo
 cratic institutions and public security. The state on the other hand is presumed
 to act as the natural defender of these by being placed opposite to the threat
 of organised crime.
 The 'goodies and the baddies' will be outside dispute. The fact that organised,
 syndicated or capitalised crime may be better conceived of as a product of
 the deep contradictions which exist within certain cultures, will rarely merit
 debate. Therefore prior to any rational critique of the mystique of the Mafia
 in the US, the public's preferred perception of organised crime was to imagine
 exotic and dangerous enemies in their midst, and went no further to understand
 the social significance of organised crime which the Godfathers were said to
 monopolise. The media is happy to conspire in such a non-problematic
 representation of organised crime to a degree where the public appetite for
 images of the Mafia fantasy is abundantly accommodated.
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 As with terrorists and terrorism, the image of organised crime has been
 produced in Australia through a mixture of real events and media reporting,
 and through the efforts of 'official' horrormongers who needed to create super
 criminals to account for the state's failure to control the criminal activity such
 persons were said to organise, and to justify further expansion of the crime
 control mechanism to achieve future success.
 Smith is one of the recent rationalist writers on the significance of the Mafia
 in the US. It is his view (1975), and one I share, that organised crime is the
 product of forces that threaten values, not the cause of them. In this regard
 if society or the state countenances violence, considers personal gain to be
 more important than equity, and is willing to see the law distorted in the pursuit
 of wealth and power, then such a society or state itself will always be receptive
 to illicit enterprise whether condoned, ignored or condemned. Such enterprise
 will become a reality whenever a group of people are willing to take advantage
 of entrepreneurial opportunities that entail selective law enforcement, violence
 and corruption in order to achieve commercial gain.
 For a government to entertain a similar view of the origins of organised
 crime, however, it would need to examine as part of its control process the
 manner in which its own bureaucracies and officials facilitate such enterprise.
 Except in very selective incidents where obvious corruption has demanded
 investigation, this has not been the chosen course of governments in Australia.
 In fact through their process of defining the nature of organised crime,
 representing the threat which it poses and constructing a unique control
 response to it, they have chosen to remove themselves from any consideration
 of its development. Again in this respect the parallels with terrorism are strong.
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which organised crime
 and terrorism are collapsed into a similar image of social/state threat. To do
 this I will discuss the various representations of organised crime in terms of
 the common ground which exists with representations of terrorism. Further,
 the similarities of state response to such phenomena through the application
 of distorted crime control mechanisms will be analysed.
 Representations of the organised crime threat
 When analysing the 'official account' of organised crime in the USA, Italy
 and Australia, it is interesting to discover certain consistency in imagery. In
 fact the preferred state position on such a phenomenon will fall within one
 or all of the following classifications no matter which jurisdiction is examined.
 Organised crime as:
 (i) the fifth estate
 (ii) the merchants of terror working toward the theft of the nation
 (iii) the 'bankers' for terrorism or
 (iv) the corruptors of morality and the 'quarter to midnight' menace.
 Each such representation involves a mixture of the following:
 (a) subversion of state interests
 (b) degrees of organised criminal behaviour
 (c) a potential for violence
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 (d) a deviant counter culture in terms of morality and collective endeavour
 (e) commercial power and influence both in the licit and illicit sense
 (f) a threat, whether immediate or long term, to the security of the individual
 or the peace and good order of the community.
 It is not stretching the comparison to suggest that the state's representation
 of terrorism may accord with the majority of those postulated above for
 organised crime. Of closer significance are the elements which are said to
 comprise the terrorist and organised crime phenomena. On a more simplistic
 level the state may even wish to expose the activities and purposes of organised
 criminals and terrorist groups as synonymous. Thus in the wake of the killing
 of Aldo Moro the Italian authorities were at pains to emphasise the intricate
 connections between mafiosi and the red brigades.
 Criminalisation
 When organised crime or acts of terrorism are deemed to be challenges to
 the legitimacy of the state, governments will move to counter the challenge
 by neutralising the ideological impetus of the opposition, as much as it will
 attempt to neutralise the active threat posed by it. A central device in this
 process of neutralisation is to define the actions of the opposition as criminal.
 In so doing the state can cloak its control response behind the rule of law,
 while enjoying the potency of the criminal sanction as a function for control.
 There are certain dangers, however, inherent in this masking function (see
 Findlay, 1984(a)). As Habermas warns (1976: 10):
 This means that the technical legal form alone, pure legality, will not be able to
 guarantee recognition in the long run, if the system of authority cannot be legitimated
 independently of the legal form of existing authority. . . . Moreover the organizations
 which are responsible for making and applying the law are in no way legitimated
 by the legality of the modes of procedure (or vice versa) but likewise by general
 interpretation which supports the system of authority as a whole, (emphasis added)
 The control equation becomes more complicated when the state, realising
 the unique nature of the threat, but not wishing to place it outside the rhetoric
 of criminality, chooses to compromise and distort the usual processes of
 criminal justice in extraordinary ways. This is not difficult to do because as
 McBarnett indicates 'Deviation from legality is institutionalised in the law itself
 (1979: 39). The ideology of the rule of law is used by the state not solely to
 make ulterior injustice, but further to mystify and confuse the reality of the
 injustice, partially and selectively in the eyes of the community. The situation
 becomes further obfuscated when the opposite to the rule of law (such as
 preventive detention, confiscation of property without trial, denial of the
 presumption of innocence, guilt by association etc.) are institutionalised through
 the 'new' administration of criminal justice. (For examples of such processes
 in both the States of Ireland see Findlay, 1984(b); 1981.) In addition, the state
 does not choose to substitute the law for the exercise of force. Force and Law
 are recognised as complementary for social control.
 The utility of the criminal sanction as a legitimate source of control rests
 on the presumption that the radical modifications to the system through which
 it is imposed will be viewed by the community as an acceptable feature of
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 proper government and a necessary response to a threat so defined. The only
 criticism of these measures which is accepted as legitimate by the respective
 governments relates to whether or not such measures are justifiable in terms
 of the potential for success in achieving their objectives. However, the real
 question is: 'Whether those modifications may become so ' 'normalized'' that
 the original objective of relying on the ordinary criminal process will itself
 become unobtainable' (Boyle, Hayden, and Hillyard, 1979: 6).
 Having discussed the representation of the threat and the response through
 criminalisation, it may be useful to examine some of these representations and
 the responses which they elicit, in more detail.
 (1) The 'fifth estate*
 In a recent press article concerning the mass trials of Mafia suspects in Palermo,
 the journalist observed that 'The Dalla Chiasa killing has had as much to do
 as anything with the Mafia's current troubles. This along with the murder of
 the Palermo prosecutor, Mr Rocco Chinnici, a year later, convinced the Italian
 judicial and executive authorities that they were dealing with a fully-fledged
 challenge to the authority of the Italian state'. ('Sicilian Mafia falls on tough
 times', The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 June 1986.)
 There couldn't be a better explanation for the current spate of Mafia show
 trials in Italy. Since the creation of the Italian confederation, the government
 in Rome has only been inclined to launching a concerted attack on the principal
 Mafia 'regions' or prominent mafiosi, when the latter have publicly challenged
 the appearance of state control.
 For example, the introduction of special laws and the pitiless repression
 carried out under the direction of the ruthless prefect Mori in 1925 was part
 of the fascist plan to crush separatist power in the south.
 'Repression was accompanied and supported by a patriotic campaign aimed
 at exalting the virtues of the Sicilian people and contrasting them to the
 "noxious weed" of the Mafia. Laws were also passed aimed at agricultural
 reclamation and colonization of the large estates. But even though inspired
 by the idea of transforming the environment in which the Mafia had been
 created and developed, through splitting up the large estates, these efforts
 stopped at the surface. They were not accompanied by a genuine transformation
 of rural life, were not supported by the necessary public works (in particular,
 irrigation and roads), and in the end were abandoned because of the Ethiopian
 venture and the Second World War.
 'In any case, the historians agree that fascism succeeded only in temporarily
 weakening the Mafia without eradicating it. This is because the social and
 economic conditions that gave rise to it remained unchanged, because it was
 mainly the brigands that infested the rural parishes and the countryside that
 had been affected and not the "powerful friends" in the cities, because a great
 and deep resentment had been created in all those, and their families, who
 felt themselves unjustly caught in the great repression. So the Mafia was able,
 for two decades of fascism, to keep the idea of a re-emergence still smouldering
 under the ashes.' (Vassali, 1974: 600-601)
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 It is interesting that the occasional recognition by successive Italian
 governments that the Mafia may act as a terrorist threat to the state, has not
 resulted in a more complex appreciation and representation of the mafiosi,
 by the state. The most the state will advance a political critique of the mafioso
 is that they are a residue of a lawless past. However, Blok (1974), like Barzini
 (1971) shows how inadequate is such a representation. His view is that the
 mafioso are an outgrowth of the particular process of state formation in Italy.
 The 4'mafia" grew up because national systems of power expanded without
 subsuming and obliterating local quasi-feudal systems of power. For long
 periods of time, various central governments in Italy had to work with the
 rural landlords and the Mafiosi whom they helped to create and patronize.
 The central government was continually compromised by the forces of
 traditional corruption and particularism. . . . What occurred in Sicily were in
 fact standard state-building processes: consolidation of control over the use
 of force, elimination of rivals, formation of coalitions, extensions of protection,
 and routine extraction of resources. If one network of mafiosi had been able
 to extend its control over all of Sicily, its actions would have become public
 instead of private, the national government would have had to deal with it,
 and insiders and outsiders alike would have begun to treat its chief as the
 legitimate authority. With the development of differentiated and centralized
 instruments of control, it would have become a state. The difficulty is that
 Sicily has many such proto-states. Sicily's problem is not a shortage, but a
 surfeit, of government: (Blok, 1974: 28)
 Yet the reservations which the state may have about entering into a detailed
 political critique of organised crime has not restrained it from instituting some
 of the most extraordinary criminal sanctions directed towards its control.
 It would be difficult to justify the extension of police and court power to
 counteract the 'Mafia menace' in Italy if one were to focus on the Mafia, as
 having a 'philosophical attitude about the political power' it uses (see Lalunia,
 1981). It is clear that irrespective of whether such a theoretical perspective is
 seriously considered by the Italian authorities they have chosen to locate the
 wrath of the criminal sanction, on representative individuals and organised
 criminal conspiracies. But not satisfied with the control potential of traditional
 criminal sanctions, they have engaged in a process of reshaping the power of
 agencies of criminal justice, so as to create a control network unconstrained
 by questions of guilt and resultant proportional punishment. They have new
 domain over restrictions of residence and movement, regulation of associations,
 and rationalisation of financial assets. And each new power can be activated
 on mere suspicion.
 Anti Mafia legislation in both Italy and the USA would seem to indicate
 that the legislatures accepted Creasey's representation of the theft of a nation
 (1969), Bobby Kennedy's warnings about the enemy within (1960) or Bequais'
 predictions about the existence of a fifth estate (1979). Yet if the state were
 to confront and deconstruct the mafia stereotype, through some broader critical
 analysis of the social conditions necessary to change the perception of power
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 which is the Mafia, the heavy hand of criminalisation as the principal response
 to such organisations and enterprises would be exposed for what it is.
 The Mafia basically does nothing but take advantage of the moral defects
 of a system in a more unscrupulous and menacing manner than other
 speculators eager for wealth. Only if those defects are eliminated from the
 framework of the entire national life can the problem of the fight against the
 Mafia be isolated and reduced to a fight against intimidating and violent
 methods: (Vassalli, 1974: 622)
 (2) The merchants of terror or the 'bankers' for terrorism
 In the 1970s the Italian public were faced with a stark increase in murders,
 kidnapping and terrorist attacks. These were sourced to criminal organisations
 and radical insurgent groups. Both terrorist groups and traditional criminal
 organisations diversified their area of enterprise, and shed their traditional
 connections with the philosophies and patronage of previous eras.
 A senior officer of the Ministry for Justice represented these developments
 as follows:
 The Red Brigades wove a network of contacts with other like-minded groups,
 such as the "Prima Linea" (Front Line) and the "Nuclei Armati Proletari"
 (Armed Proletarian Nuclei). These organisations were responsible for the
 ferocious murder of dozens of politicians, judges, journalists, lawyers, labor
 unionists, and the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro, which was
 the culmination and the most tragic episode in their assault "at the heart of
 the State".
 'Over that period, organized common crime increased sharply as it extended
 its links and as the traditional criminal organizations tended to merge. Little
 by little, they shed any vestiges of what positive?albeit deviant?values they
 might earlier have had, as they abandoned the poor sector of the agricultural
 economy and made inroads into the richer private and public building
 construction and industrial sectors. Drug trafficking and protection rackets
 became full-scale industries that spread nationwide, while preserving all their
 efficiency through intimidation, and the iron rule of connivance and sealed
 lips ("omerta").
 'Sardinian banditism exported the knowhow of kidnapping to the mainland.
 Personal and objective contacts were forged between organized common crime
 and political criminals as they increasingly resorted to common crime to finance
 their activities, and as the ideological "conversions" of common criminals
 proliferated, particularly in the prisons, as a result of the political proselytizing
 campaigns.
 'Organized crime, now that there was no longer a clearcut distinction between
 "mobsters" and terrorists, penetrated and spread throughout the richest sectors
 of the Italian economy, and revenues soared as they infiltrated the whole of
 the economic fabric by recycling their money through the banks, gaming houses,
 and by importing and exporting currency.
 'The underworld seemed to have undergone a sort of metastesis now that
 it was no longer confined to local pockets, and was attacking the whole of
 civil society everywhere and at every level.' (Carramazza, 1983)
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 Having established this image that an emergency situation was developing
 through the 1970s, in the form of collaboration between the Mafia and the
 red brigades, the Italian government proposed radical control measures, the
 severity of which was to be consonant with the difficulties of the moment.
 The Constitution of the Republic prohibited the formation of secret societies.
 In 1956 (Law 1423) and 1965 (Law 575) provision was made for internal exile
 for persons endangering public security and public morality and for persons
 accused of belonging to Mafia style societies (N.B. the similar laws in both
 states of Ireland which penalise suspected membership of proscribed organisa
 tions?Findlay, 1984(b)). The main intention of such legislation was to uproot
 the 'dangerous' individual from his own territory in order to break up the
 local organisation and then eradicate it.
 In the early '70s a wave of legislation was brought down to deal with the
 new organised crime/terrorism threat.2 Without examining the details of these
 provisions, it is sufficient to note that they covered:
 ?increased police powers to detain and search suspects even if not caught
 in the act of committing a crime. Also the powers to search and confiscate
 whole blocks of buildings under certain circumstances
 ?extension of periods of preventive detention
 ?denial of parole
 ?the creation of new criminal offences such as 'the subversion of democratic
 order'
 ?increase in certain criminal penalties
 ?creation of new mitigating circumstances such as 'dissociation' and
 'repentance' for persons turning state's evidence.
 On 13 September 1982 the Italian authorities enacted law No. 646, just a
 few days after the assassination at Palermo, of General Delia Chiesa, who
 had been sent to Sicily by the government, to fight the Mafia. The La Torre
 Law3 which represents one of the most recent legislative assaults by the Italian
 parliament, on the Mafia, includes two fundamental innovations,
 (i) the introduction into the criminal law, of a new crime, being 'the Mafia
 conspiracy', and
 (ii) the creation of the potential for the courts to seize and confiscate the goods
 of persons belonging to such a 'Mafia conspiracy', as well as those of
 relatives, partners and co-inhabitants who in the previous five years prior
 to the court order, played a 'front man' role in helping covering up original
 Mafia activities.
 The provisions of the new law were intended to attack the accumulation
 of wealth by the mafiosi, which is perceived by the authorities as the principal
 motivating force for their criminal activity on a large scale. In this respect
 the philosophy from which the legislation emanated, had two significant
 concerns:
 (i) that the law should concentrate on the consequences of assumed
 criminality, rather than the particular instances of criminal behaviour, and
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 (ii) that by concentrating on the motives for criminal enterprise, both past
 and future, the individual and general deterrent potential of the criminal
 law would be significantly increased.
 'To arrive at the point of confiscation, the following procedure has been
 established: the District Attorney or the Chief of Police requests the police
 force to make enquiries into the standard of living, the financial status and
 the possession of property of the individuals who are suspected of belonging
 to criminal associations. Such investigations are directed toward finding out
 whether or not the property of the investigated person has been acquired legally.
 If sufficient circumstantial evidence indicates that the suspect's property has
 been acquired illegally, such property will be proposed for seizure. The proposal
 for seizure is either accepted or rejected by the court set up to judge such cases,
 and if such a proposal is accepted, the property is seized. Within a year, the
 same court must conclude the case and decide either to release the property
 or to order its definite confiscation.' (Arlacchi, 1984: 93)
 The government's interest in attacking the financial gains of illicit 'Mafia'
 enterprises was sensitised over the past two decades by the rapidly expanding
 concentration of such enterprises in the realm of drug trafficking. To facilitate
 their financial advantage and to expand their power over the drug market,
 Mafia firms developed a very high level of interrelations between the legal
 and illegal sectors of the economy. Labour, capital and methods of organisation
 of the illegal sector have been transferred without great difficulty to the legal
 sector of the economy, allowing Mafia 'firms' to apply illegally obtained capital
 sources to legitimate business, and therefore to greatly diversify their
 commercial capacity.
 In this way the Mafia may not only be seen to be challenging the state by
 financially supporting terrorist activities or engaging in them for commercial
 gain, but also by undermining the free market ideology of the capitalist state.
 Bearing in mind the financial consequences of the Mafia's ability to straddle
 or drift between certain licit and illicit business endeavours, the confiscation
 provisions might be viewed not only as an extension of the criminal sanction
 but also as a financial regulation directed against unfair or restrictive
 commercial practices.
 The La Torre Law was more far reaching than forfeiture provisions not
 previously unknown to the criminal law, with respect to illegally acquired
 property. Here the property may belong to suspects or their associates and
 may only be seen as generally arising from the enterprises organised out of
 certain general Mafia conspiracies. The property concerned is not simply the
 immediately identifiable product of some particular criminal offence, for which
 the originators have been convicted. In addition, unlike forfeiture, the con
 fiscation provisions are aimed at doing more than merely depriving a criminal
 of certain 'ill-gotten gains'. They are designed to present an actionable barrier
 between the illegal (or semi-legal) financial market and the legal sector of the
 economy. As such, it is intended to have the following general effects: it helps
 control the acquisition and re-investment of criminal wealth, and it reduces
 the amount of goods of illegal origin that become legitimate, and therefore
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 can be the subject of commercial transactions or be transferred through
 inheritance.
 (3) The 'Quarter to Midnight' panic
 In 1952 the then Chairman of a somewhat sensationalist, now rather discredited
 (Moore: 1974) Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime, wrote of
 the USA: Tt is a fearful thing to contemplate how close we . . . have come
 to the saturation point of criminal and political corruption which may destroy
 our strength as a nation ... I say we are dangerously close to that ruination
 point?if not right on it. However, although the hour is late it is not too late . . .'
 In 1985 Australia, retired NSW Supreme Court Justice and one-time Royal
 Commissioner into the infiltration of organised crime into NSW registered
 clubs, Athol Moffit, took up the analogy in his book 'A Quarter to Midnight'.
 He placed his fear of organised crime in a somewhat global perspective:
 The things I say about the escalation of organised crime, corruption and a decline
 in the independence of the institutions of justice will not be directly apparent to
 most people. History has shown that the decline of a nation is from within. It is
 not apparent from year to year to its citizens and mostly it is not apparent to leaders
 of the nation in decline. No doubt the citizens of Rome did not perceive the forces
 of decline pointed out by writers such as Gibbon. As I said in 1974, the organised
 crime which would come upon us would be unnoticed, as were those who came
 in the Trojan horse. If more is not done, decline to a point of no or near-impossible
 return will not be a notorious event which happens at a particular time or in a
 particular year. It will just be apparent to those who look at some not-distant future
 time that we have problems which are then intractable. It will be past midnight.
 (Moffit, 1985: 24)
 A similar tone of impending doom was presented by Frank Costigan in his
 contribution to the Senate Organized Crime Seminar in June 1983. Costigan
 stated that if nothing were to be done to control the problem of organised
 crime, 'within five years this country will become a jungle. The wild animals
 will not bite everyone, but their presence will be known and feared'. (Costigan,
 1984: 12)
 Recently Royal Commissioners Woodward, Williams, Moffat and Costigan
 have represented themselves in the media somewhat like prophets crying in
 the wilderness. Woodward more recently implied that government intransigence
 in not moving to implement the recommendations of his Royal Commission,
 concerned with the control of organised crime, verges on complicity.
 Those with the privileged and undisclosed insight into organised crime4 claim
 greater legitimacy and significance for their warnings because they are, like
 jury verdicts, absolute and incontrovertible. We are told on the one hand that
 many of their most powerful discoveries are, for a variety of reasons, not
 appropriate for public information, and that we must take their warnings on
 trust. In addition we are asked to further accept these undisclosed revelations
 of doom as the justification for significant inroads into the personal liberties
 of the individual citizen, for the greater good.
 Costigan, for example, in his final reports, recommends these as a selection
 of new control powers:
 ?the establishment of linked public information systems to facilitate the pursuit
 of the 'paper trail'
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 ?the appointment of special prosecutors
 ?the establishment of specialised 'quasi police' investigation agencies
 ?the use of public disclosure as a sanction
 ?the power for committees and commissioners to compulsorily require
 appearance before them, production of documents and the supply of answers
 to all questions whether they be self incriminating or not.
 And what of the serious risk to civil liberties which it could be argued these
 initiatives might pose? Again we are taken back to the warnings and fear
 imagery.
 We are entitled to expect the assistance of the State to protect us from the activities
 of the so-called ordinary criminal; and we do not receive such assistance.
 We are equally entitled to expect that the State will step in to counter the far
 more sophisticated and dangerous activities of organized national and international
 crime. If criminal organizations are allowed to operate unhindered, the citizens of
 this country will suffer a major loss of freedom. This right to remain free of the
 impact of organized crime, and the right to have this infringement controlled, are
 just as legitimate civil liberties as those we value so highly and so properly, vis-a
 vis the State. (Costigan, 1984:18)
 Conclusion
 In his essays to ANZAAS on organised crime (1983), Doug Meagher QC, then
 senior counsel assisting the Costigan Royal Commission, drew direct compari
 sons between organised crime and terrorism. He established these comparisons
 in terms of the behavioural elements which defined such phenomena, the threat
 they posed to society and the nature of an appropriate response by the state
 for their control.
 '(The Baader-Meinhof) is, of course, a terrorist group rather than simply
 a criminal group. However, it meets all my criteria and so far as I am concerned
 creates problems of the same order as do sophisticated criminal organizations.
 The circumstances that the criminal activities of a terrorist group are designed
 to achieve (sic) ultimately some political end rather than financial, does not
 seem to me to make the existence or the operations of the group less pernicious,
 nor to create any less difficulty for law enforcement agencies in the discharge
 of their duties.' (Meagher, 1983: 21-22)
 By concentrating on the representations of organised crime and terrorism,
 as well as the state response through criminalisation I have endeavoured to
 indicate that from a state perspective it seems to matter little what the unique
 characteristics of the behaviour may be, or what are the somewhat distorted
 features of the criminal justice response. What is important, both with terrorism
 and organised crime, is the state's desire to distance itself from the dynamics
 of the phenomena concerned. By universalising the social threat and objectify
 ing the 'rule of law response', the state can portray itself as the impartial
 protector of civil peace no matter what form a challenge to its existence may
 take.
 Footnotes
 i Spokesmen from both the Fraser and Hawke governments have embraced the moral panic rhetoric
 when referring in particular to the drug trade examples of organised crime.
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 2 Law 497/1974 was called the 'New Provisions against Crime' Act; Law 152/1975 and law 533/1977
 was the 'Protection of Public Order' Act, while the Statutory Instrument 625/1979 (enacted as
 Law 15/1980) was for 'The Defense of the Democratic Order', and Law 646/1982 was the 'Defence
 of the Constitutional Order' Act.
 3 This law is popularly known at the 'La Torre Law' named after one of its promoters, Pio La Torre,
 a member of parliament who was also assassinated at Palermo by the Mafia, five months prior
 to Dalla Chiesa.
 4 Costigan has implied that perhaps 'it is only those who have served on Commissions of Inquiry,
 touching on such matters (as organised crime) who have been able to describe authoritatively the
 nature and extent of organised crime in Australia'. He goes on to advocate that this select group
 should continue to have the opportunity to do so (Costigan, E X. (1983) Interim Report No. 5
 Vol. 1, Royal Commission into the Activities of the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union
 (Chapt. II)).
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